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Abstract: Many markets encounter difficulty maintaining a thick marketplace because 
they experience transactions made at dispersed times. To address such problems, many 
markets try to establish norms concerning when offers can be made, accepted and 
rejected. Examining such markets suggests it is difficult to establish a thick market at an 
efficient time if firms can make exploding offers, and workers cannot renege on early 
commitments. Laboratory experiments allow us to isolate the effects of exploding offers 
and binding acceptances. In a simple experiment, we find inefficient early contracting 
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Many markets have experienced difficulty in maintaining a marketplace in which 
transactions are made at a time and in a manner that promote efficiency. One obstacle in 
a number of markets has been the use of exploding offers. In such markets, firms make 
offers to which applicants must respond very quickly, and these markets often clear very 
fast, with firms as well as applicants having little opportunity to consider many 
alternatives (see e.g. Roth and Xiaolin Xing 1994 for an account of a number of such 
“unraveled” markets).  
Partly for these reasons, different markets have different rules, norms, and 
expectations about how and when offers will be made, accepted, and rejected.  For 
example, in some labor markets, exploding offers are rare.  Similarly, norms differ 
concerning the circumstances under which a candidate may honorably change her mind 
about an offer she has accepted.   
These are issues of considerable practical importance. A case in point is the entry 
level labor market for American gastroenterologists, which, as we began the work 
reported here, was suffering from just the kinds of unraveling mentioned above. Offers, 
often exploding offers, were made to aspiring gastroenterologists two years before 
employment would begin (while they were still engaged in their internal medicine 
residency). This had caused a number of problems for the market (see Niederle and Roth, 
2003a), and the gastroenterology professional organizations became interested in trying 
to reestablish a thick market that would seek to hire applicants only one year in advance. 
But many employers (fellowship program directors) were concerned that, even though 
they would like the market to be later and thicker, they could be harmed if they waited for 
an orderly market but their competitors continued to lock up the best candidates early 
with exploding offers. So the question arose, what policies could the gastroenterology 
organizations adopt to make it safe for employers to wait and participate in the market at 
an efficient time?  
It turns out that in many markets, formal market organizations exist that seek to 
regulate how and when offers are made, accepted, and rejected (see Niederle and Roth, 
2009).  Examining these markets together, in terms of their rules about offers and 
acceptances, suggests a pattern: Markets that have suffered from unraveling and have 
been successful in reversing it and restoring a later market have done so either by 
preventing firms from making exploding offers, or by establishing rules and conventions   2
that allow candidates who accept early offers to change their minds under some 
circumstances.
1  
This paper reports an experiment designed to investigate the interplay between the 
rules by which offers are made, accepted, and rejected, and the timing and efficiency of 
the resulting market.  Our experimental results confirm the pattern suggested by our 
reading of the field evidence. In the laboratory, unraveled markets move towards later, 
more efficient markets if firms can only make open but not exploding offers. The same 
thing is observed even when firms can make exploding offers, as long as candidates can 
subsequently change their minds without too much cost if they receive more desirable 
offers later. However unraveled markets remain inefficiently early when firms can make 
exploding offers and acceptances are binding. 
 
One market in which a good deal of effort has been spent shaping and discussing 
the timing of offers and acceptances is the market for graduate students.  The Council of 
Graduate Schools has, since the mid 1960’s, attempted to establish norms concerning 
how graduate students are recruited.  Over 350 American universities subscribe to its 
resolution
2, which attempts to foster a market culture in which exploding offers are 
discouraged directly, and also indirectly by being made less enforceable.  Students are 
told that all universities have agreed that they need not respond to offers before April 15, 
but that if they are pressed to respond to some offer(s) before they have had the chance to 
adequately consider others, they have the option “to accept each one and then, by April 
15, resign from all but one.” That is, the resolution suggests that a student who accepts an 
exploding offer with a deadline before April 15, but subsequently declines it before April 
15, should not be thought of as behaving badly.  This reduces the cost of reneging on 
(and hence also of accepting) an exploding offer. 
 
Similar concerns, and attempts to alter market culture, have played large roles in 
the organization of entry level labor markets for doctors, for lawyers, and college 
admissions at the undergraduate level.  Presently, law students who apply for appellate 
                                                           
1 See Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard Posner, and Roth, 2001, 2007 and Avery, Andrew 
Fairbanks and Richard Zeckhauser, 2003,; Guillaume Frechette, Roth and M. Utku Unver, 2007, Susan 
Mongell and Roth 2001; Niederle, Deborah D. Proctor and Roth 2006; Roth 1984, 1991; Roth and Xing 
1994, 1997 for descriptions of some of the markets in which unraveling has been an issue. 
2 www.cgsnet.org/PublicationsPolicyRes/resolutions.htm#resolution1   3
court clerkships are frequently given exploding offers, and are almost never reported to 
renege on them (Roth and Xing 1994; Avery et al, 2001, 2007).
3  
 
II. Experimental Matching Markets 
 
The experimental markets consisted of 5 firms and 6 applicants. Firms have a 
fixed quality, from 1 to 5, and applicants will eventually have a quality from 1 to 6. The 
qualities of firms are simply their assigned ID number from 1 to 5, the qualities of 
applicants are revealed over time. In each market a firm can hire one applicant and an 
applicant can work for one firm. A matched firm and applicant each earn the product of 
their qualities, unmatched market participants earn zero.
4 
  Each market lasts 9 periods. In periods 1, 4 and 7 each applicant receives an 
integer signal from 1 to 10 (uniform iid). The quality of each applicant is determined in 
period 7 through the relative ranking of the sum of their three signals. Note that while 
signals across periods are uncorrelated, because the final quality is determined by the sum 
of signals, the relative quality after two signals is heavily influenced by the quality of the 
first signal, that is the relative quality (the sum of signals) is correlated over time. The 
applicant with the highest sum receives a quality of 6, the second highest a quality of 5, 
the lowest a quality of 1 (ties are broken randomly).
5 Firms see all the applicants’ signals 
as they become available over time, but applicants only receive information about their 
own signals.
6  Having three periods in which new information is revealed allows us to 
observe several “degrees” of inefficiency of early matching. 
Each information state lasts for 3 periods in which firms can make offers, and 
applicants decide whether to accept or reject them. This helps avoid exogenously 
imposed congestion, which occurs when firms may run out of time to make offers they 
                                                           
3 However, not all markets that use exploding offers and binding agreements suffer from unraveling. For 
example, in the market for junior economists, many departments impose short deadlines, though the market 
as a whole has for many years largely opened at the winter meetings.  
4 There are no monetary transfers between firms and applicants, they each receive the mutual gains of 
matching, equally. 
5 In this environment, it is possible that, after two signals, the applicant of the highest quality, or the 
applicant of the lowest quality, though not both, can be deduced by the firms, but not by the applicants 
(who do not see others’ signals).  
6 This feature of the experimental environment is motivated by the situation in many markets, in which 
firms see a whole pool of applicants, but applicants may have difficulty knowing how they compare with 
other applicants   4
would have liked to make. In pure strategy equilibria, congestion does not occur, by 
assumption. However, in laboratory markets, even a small amount of coordination failure 
would lead to congestion, and potential congestion in late periods would provide an 
additional reason for firms to make early offers, and an additional source of inefficiency. 
(In naturally occurring markets, congestion is common; see the discussion in Roth and 
Xing 1997; Roth 2008). John Kagel and Roth (2000) report an experiment in which early 
matching arises in response to congestion.) Three periods of making offers should be 
sufficient in our environment, because once information about applicants' qualities is 
revealed, the assortative matching, even among a subset of firms and applicants, is 
apparent.
 7  
 
We consider two types of offers that can be made by firms:  
An exploding offer is an offer that the applicant can only accept right away, i.e. in the 
same period in which it was made. If an exploding offer is not accepted immediately, it is 
rejected. 
 
An open offer is an offer the applicant can also hold (until period 9).  That is, an applicant 
who receives an open offer may accept or reject it immediately, or may hold it, to accept 




In a given period, first all firms decide what offers they will make. Each firm that is 
unmatched, and has no open offer being held by an applicant, may decide to make at 
most one offer. Then each applicant learns of all offers he receives in that period before 
having to decide how to respond to each of them. If an applicant accepts the offer of a 
firm, the applicant and the firm are matched, and all market participants are informed 
                                                           
7 While this avoids exogenously imposed congestion, congestion may develop endogenously, if applicants 
hold offers until late, or firms delay making offers. Roth and Axel Ockenfels 2002 discuss congestion 
arising endogenously in an auction market, in which bidders delay making bids until near the close of the 
auction. Markets that use centralized clearinghouses avoid congestion, and often have adopted the 
clearinghouse for this reason. 
8 This is not an onerous constraint for the applicants, since they have strict, unchanging preferences over 
the firms. In our experimental environment, it reduces the cost to a firm of making an open offer, since it 
reduces the likelihood that an open offer will be held by an applicant who has no intention of taking it.   5
about this.  Offers are made in private; i.e. until they have been accepted they are not 
announced to the other firms and workers.  
We consider three environments, characterized by different rules governing offers 
and acceptances. 
 
Treatment 1: Exploding and Open offers 
Each firm can decide whether to make each offer open or exploding. Once an applicant 
accepts an offer, the acceptance is binding, and firms cannot make subsequent offers to 
an applicant who has already accepted an offer.
 9 
 
Treatment 2: Open Offers Only 
Firms can only make open offers. Once an applicant accepts an offer, the acceptance is 
binding, and firms cannot make subsequent offers to an applicant who has already 
accepted an offer. 
 
Treatment 3: Renege 
In this treatment, firms can again decide whether to make open or exploding offers. 
However, an applicant who accepted an offer may still receive further offers. An 
applicant can renege on initial acceptances and accept a new offer at a cost of 1 point 
(that is subtracted from his final payment).
10 
 
All three treatments allow for a whole array of Bayesian Nash equilibria. For 
example, in each treatment, there is an equilibrium in which, after the first period, all the 
firms are matched. For example, the following strategies constitute an equilibrium in 
which all firms are matched in Period 1. 
Strategies of firms: Each firm i makes an open offer in period 1 to applicant i. A 
firm whose offer is rejected never makes another offer. 
                                                           
9 One can also think of the applicants’ ability to make binding agreements as an agreement among firms to 
not make offers to applicants who accepted another firm’s offer.  
10 This fee is smaller than the minimum improvement from accepting a match with a higher quality firm, 
since matches pay each applicant the product of his quality and the quality of the firm to which he is 
matched.   6
Strategies of applicants: Each applicant i in period 1 accepts an open offer from 
firm i and rejects any other offers (i.e. exploding offers, offers from other firms, 
and offers received in other periods).  
These strategies constitute an equilibrium, as no firm has an incentive to deviate, given 
the strategies of applicants and vice versa. However, this equilibrium has the unattractive 
property of using weakly dominated strategies. 
 
However, in each of the different conditions, when firms and applicants are risk neutral 
there is a sequential equilibrium that yields late matching and the efficient outcome. But  
the possibility of late matching is less robust in the case of exploding offers and binding 
agreements than in the other two conditions.
11   
In particular, since a strategy is a function that specifies an agent’s actions at each 
of his information sets, we can (even in the renege condition) speak of an agent as 
adopting a strategy of “locking in” an offer at some point of any of the experimental 
treatments by accepting the offer, and not later reneging on it even if a preferred offer is 
received.
12  We can now state the following. 
 
Proposition:  
In the open offer and the renege treatments, it is a weakly dominated strategy for 
applicants to lock in any but the highest quality firm (for open offers: highest quality 
unmatched firm) early, before period 7.  In the exploding offer treatment, it is not a 
weakly dominated strategy for the applicant to accept an exploding offer early (before 
period 7), which means it is not a weakly dominated strategy to lock in a firm early. 
 
Proof:  
  We first observe that in each information set of the exploding offer treatment (i.e. 
for any set of matched firms and workers) for any period t < 7, the strategy that calls for 
applicant i to accept an exploding offer from firm j is not a weakly dominated strategy.  
                                                           
11 The proofs, and statements of equilibrium strategies and beliefs are straightforward but tedious; they can 
be found in a technical addendum to the paper in the online appendix or at www.stanford.edu/~niederle . 
12 Since an agent’s strategy is a function from his information sets to his actions at those information sets, a 
player can adopt a strategy at the beginning of the game that determines his actions later in the game.    7
  Since there are more applicants than firms, there must be at least one other 
unmatched applicant at any information set at which i receives one or more offers (if i has 
received more than one offer there are at least as many other unmatched applicants as 
offers i has received).  Suppose the strategies of the firms and other applicants are such 
that each unmatched firm of higher quality than the best offer i has received has each 
made an offer to a different applicant, and that these applicants will accept these offers. 
Furthermore, firms that are rejected by i each will make their next offer to a distinct other 
applicant, and these offers will be accepted. Then i will not receive a better offer, and 
would do better to accept its best exploding offer rather than rejecting it. (This is 
sufficient to show that accepting an exploding offer is not a dominated strategy, but note 
further that the strategies of the other firms and applicants are not themselves absurd. 
Given that i’s offers come from the only firms that will remain unmatched, even highly 
rational rejected suitors may not renew their offer to i, if they instead refrain from making 
any other offers until period 7, when final qualities are known. The reason is that for 
every set of i’s signals, there is a positive chance that the other remaining applicant(s) 
will eventually be of higher quality than i in period 7. So if applicant i rejects its best 
offer in a period when all other firms will become matched, it cannot do better than to 
receive that offer again, and with positive probability it will not, so it would have been 
strictly better off accepting the exploding offer earlier.) 
  We now note that in the open offer and renege treatments it is a weakly 
dominated strategy for a worker to lock in a firm before period 7 if any higher quality 
firm remains unmatched, because in the event that such a firm made an offer later, it 
would be profitable to decline the initial offer. (Note that in the renege condition, even 
firms whose offers have been accepted can be regarded as unmatched in this sense since 
that acceptance could be reneged upon).  
 
This suggests that the firms’ behavior may be different in the different conditions. 
In the case of exploding offers and binding acceptances, (risk neutral) firms are always 
prepared to make early offers to applicants who have an expected quality that is higher 
than the one the firm receives in the stable match.
13 In the open offer and renege 
                                                           
13 In the late matching equilibrium, applicants reject such offers.   8
condition, firms may not be prepared to make any early offers, as applicants would 
simply use the offer’s option value, which can only reduce the firms’ profits.   
This difference may affect the robustness of the various equilibrium refinements 
to deviations from equilibrium, e.g. to random or other non-equilibrium behavior of some 
participants. For example, suppose there are some applicants who do not want to reject 
offers without a better offer in hand. 
In the case of exploding offers and binding acceptances, such applicants will 
accept early (exploding) offers. This implies that firms will have an incentive to make 
early offers to applicants with an expected quality higher than the firms’ equilibrium 
match and there will be early transactions in such markets.  
Furthermore these early matched applicants (and firms) impose a negative 
externality on (higher quality) firms that do not make an early offer, but which may want 
to hire these applicants later on. The reason is that these applicants irreversibly accepted 
an early offer from a lower quality firm. If this negative externality is high enough, high 
quality firms will be well advised to also start making early offers (to applicants whose 
expected value is lower than the quality they would receive in an assortative match in 
period 7), only to prevent high quality applicants from being captured early by low 
quality firms. These early offers are also accepted by rational applicants, which implies 
that an even bigger portion of the market moves early. So, a few applicants who do not 
reject early offers can affect the incentives of all firms and applicants, such that matching 
late is not an equilibrium any more. By this mechanism a few applicants can affect the 
timing of a much bigger portion of the market, and cause the market to transact early.
14 
In contrast, in the open offers and renege treatment, applicants who do not want to 
reject offers (without having another offer in hand) can merely hold on to the offer, and 
use it as an option. Such applicants would not differ from rational applicants, who would 
also use the option value of an offer. So, in the open offers and renege treatments (and 
again, in contrast to the exploding offer treatment) even when faced with these kinds of 
applicants, firms do not benefit from making early offers, and indeed have a strict 
incentive not to make early offers. Furthermore, suppose there were a few applicants who 
                                                           
14 However, it cannot be the case that in a pure strategy equilibrium all firms match before the uncertainty 
is resolved, as then, for example, the worst firm among the ones that make offers in the last period in which 
there are unmatched firms would have an incentive to not make the offer, and rather hire the better of the 
remaining 2 applicants once the uncertainty is resolved.   9
would not only hold, but accept early offers in the open offer treatment, or never renege 
upon accepting an early offer in the renege treatment, that is applicants who “lock in” an 
offer early. Even in this case the incentives for firms to make early offers are 
considerably weaker than in the exploding offer case, since other applicants would still 
use firms’ early offers as an option. This makes equilibria with early matching less likely 
to be robust when firms can make only open offers or when acceptances are not binding. 
  
Thus, each of the treatments has multiple equilibria, including a sequential 
equilibrium with efficient late matching. However, the late matching equilibrium appears 
to be less robust in the exploding offer (with binding agreements) treatment, than in both 
the open offer and renege treatment. Similarly, early matching seems less robust in these 
two treatments than in the case of exploding offers and binding agreements.   
 
  We conducted 7 sessions of the exploding offer treatment, and 6 sessions each of 
the open offer and renege treatments. Subjects participated in only one session, each of 
which consisted of twenty consecutive markets. Participants kept their role, firm or 
applicant, for the whole experiment, and for firms, also the firm ID and hence quality 
(from 1 to 5). The experiment was conducted at the Harvard Business School, with 
students, using z-Tree software (Urs Fischbacher, 2007). Firms 1 and 2 received an 
additional amount of $5,
15 and each participant received $0.10 for each point earned. All 
participants received a $10 show up fee. 
 
III. Results of the Experiment: Unraveling, Thickness, and Efficiency  
 
First we investigate whether different rules concerning offers and acceptances affect the 
timing of the market. How long do firms wait to extend offers, and hence how much 
information about an applicant’s quality do firms have when extending offers that were 
eventually accepted?   
A market is efficiently late if final offers, i.e. offers that were eventually accepted, 
are all made after period 7, once all the uncertainty about applicants’ qualities is resolved. 
                                                           
15 The instructions stated that some participants, already determined in advance, would receive some 
additional fixed payment (see instructions).   10
Figure 1 shows the timing of final offers for all treatments over all 20 markets. The 
timing is presented in terms of how many signals had been revealed before the offers 
were made. So a value of 1 corresponds to offers made when only one signal was 
available (periods 1-3), 2 denotes offers made after 2 signals, i.e. offers made in periods 
4-6, and 3 signals corresponds to the final quality of applicants being known, that is 
offers made in periods 7-9. For the renege treatment, we only consider an offer to be final 
if it was accepted and not reneged upon. The results are presented in blocks of five 
markets.   
 
Figure 1. For each treatment and blocks of markets, the time at which final offers 
were made (i.e. offers that eventually result in a match) measured in the number 
of available signals about the applicants' quality. 
 
The first 5 markets in all treatments look similar, there is no significant difference in the 
average number of signals observed before firms make their final offers (that is offers 
that result in a match).
16 All significance tests in this paper are two sided Mann Whitney 
tests, and a data point is always the session average of the variable at hand. As such, the 
number of data points is 12, when we compare the treatment with open offers to the 
renege treatment, and 13 for any comparison that involves the exploding offer treatment 
(unless otherwise noted).   
  As participants gain experience, matches come to be made later in the open offer 
and the renege treatments, but not in the exploding offer treatment. In the last five 
markets (markets 16-20), final offers in the exploding offer treatment are made with 
                                                           
16 A two sided Mann Whitney U test on session averages on the average number of signals observed when 
making a final offer in the first five markets, gives p values of 0.63 when comparing Open to Renege, 0.32 
when comparing Renege to Exploding and 0.32 when comparing Open to Exploding.   11
significantly fewer signals than in the renege treatment (p < 0.01) and the open offer 
treatment (p < 0.01),
17 while the renege and the open treatment are not significantly 
different (p = 0.63). Thus we see that open offers and the applicants’ ability to renege 
help the market to defer the timing of contracts, even when the market begins with early 
appointments (as in the first five markets of Figure 1).  In the analyses that follow, we’ll 
show that the markets in the exploding offer condition are not only earlier than the others, 
but that they also exhibit the other classic symptoms of unraveling. 
 
III.A: Transaction Times and Market Thickness: 
From now on we focus our attention on the last 5 markets in each experiment, when 
conditions seem to have stabilized. We now investigate the timing of offers in more 
detail. Figure 2 shows, for each treatment, in the last five markets, the percentage of 
offers that were made when one, two or all three signals (3 signals = final quality) about 
the applicants’ quality were available. 












Figure 2. For each treatment, in the last five markets (markets 16-20), the proportion of 
final offers that were made when one, two or all three signals (and hence the final 
quality) about applicants’ quality were available.  
 
Like Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that unraveling occurs when firms can make exploding 
offers and acceptances are binding. When firms are forced to make open offers, or when 
applicants can renege on their acceptance, the markets experience almost no unraveling. 
                                                           
17 Furthermore, we can compute for each of the last five markets in any session the average number of 
signals the five firms had when making their final offer. The exploding offer market with the highest such 
number among the 35 markets (that is, the one where on average the five firms saw the most signals before 
making their final offer), has a lower number than the market with the lowest average number of signals 
used by the five firms in any of the last five markets in any session of either the open or the renege 
treatments.    12
Furthermore, high quality firms 4 and 5 also make early final offers. In the exploding 
offer treatment, only about 20% of firms 4 and 5 make final offers after 3 signals are 
available (and 34% after 1 signal), compared to 88% and 90% in the open offer and 
renege treatment.   
 The fact that the open offer treatment and the exploding offer treatment are so 
different suggests that firms make exploding offers when they are given the opportunity 
to do so. Indeed, in the last five markets of the exploding offer treatment, only firm 1 
makes an open offer in more than 10% of the markets (while firm 5 makes no open offers 
at all).  Except for firms 3 and 4, every firm made an exploding offer in every one of the 
last five markets in each of the seven sessions of the exploding offer treatment (and firms 
3 and 4 made exploding offers in 34 of these 35 markets).   In the renege treatment, firms 
make somewhat more open offers, but the vast majority of firms (at least 67%) make an 
exploding offer in each of the last five markets.  
Thus when firms could make open and exploding offers, the majority of offers 
were exploding.  Firms made use of their ability to make exploding offers to put pressure 
on applicants.  However, this effect was more pronounced when acceptances were 
binding. When applicants can renege on their acceptance the value of making an 
exploding offer is smaller, and firms made less use of that option. 
Furthermore, in the exploding offer treatment, firms made many more early offers 
than in either the open or the renege treatment. When we consider the number of offers 
before period 7 in each of the last five markets of each session, then on average, sessions 
in the exploding offer treatment experienced about 44 early offers, compared to 12 in the 
open and renege. Furthermore the exploding offer session with the lowest number of such 
offers has more offers than the renege or open offer session with the most early offers. 
We hypothesized that differences are driven by the fact that applicants would not use 
weakly dominated strategies such as locking in firms early that are not the highest firm 
(or the highest unmatched firm in the open offer treatment). Indeed, we find that 
applicants use weakly dominated strategies only rarely, about twice per session totaled 
over all last five markets in the open offer treatment, and five times in the renege 
treatment (out of about 70 and 45 instances in which they could have done so).  
   13
So far we examined the offers and the timing of final offers that were eventually 
accepted, averaged across different markets; now we explore the timing at the level of 
each market. A transaction is made (and announced to the market) only when an offer is 
accepted.  The following table shows for each treatment the timing of first acceptances in 
each of the last five markets (where we use only final acceptances that were not reneged 
upon for the renege treatment).  
  1 Signal (1-3)  2 Signals (4-6)  3 Signals (7-9) 
Exploding .71  .29  0 
Open   0  .23  .77 
Renege .30  .10  .60 
Table 1: For each treatment (in the last five markets) the proportion of markets whose 
first acceptance (which was not reneged upon in the renege treatment) was made when 
only one signal, 2 signals, or 3 signals (and hence the final quality) about applicants’ 
quality were available.  
 
Markets with exploding offers not only experience early contracting on average, 71% of 
the markets have their first acceptance with only signal 1 available. All 35 markets (the 
last five markets of all 7 sessions of the exploding offer condition) have their first 
acceptance before the final quality of applicants becomes available. In contrast, when 
firms can only make open offers, or when acceptances by applicants are not binding, 77% 
and 60% of the markets, respectively, experience their first acceptance only after all the 
uncertainty about applicants’ quality is resolved.
18  
A further piece of evidence for strategic causes of unraveling comes from 
examining the length of the market, i.e. the timing between the first and the last 
acceptance. In the exploding offer treatment, 32 out of 35 markets last for 5 or more 
periods (with 10 lasting exactly 5 periods). In the open offers and the renege treatment, 
the first final offers are made later, and the markets also last for a shorter time. In the 
renege treatment, 40% of the markets last for 5 or more periods, and for the open offer 
treatment, the number is 23%. The fact that the markets in the exploding offer treatment 
last so long shows that unraveling in this treatment is not caused simply by a desire to 
avoid congestion. 
                                                           
18 Even though markets with different rules concerning exploding offers experience a difference in timing 
of the first accepted offer, their last accepted offer is predominately in periods 7-9. In the open and renege 
treatment, not a single market (of the last five markets) ends before period 7, and in the exploding offer 
treatment, 89% (31 out of 35) of the last five markets finish after period 7. Note that, in each treatment, the 
last firm to be unmatched has strong incentives to wait and see which of the two remaining applicants is of 
higher quality.     14
  To put it another way, in the unraveled markets the offers are not just earlier, but 
also dispersed, making the market less thick in any period.  Figure 3 shows the 
cumulative distribution of offers that were finally accepted, and makes clear that in the 
last three periods, when all information is available, the market is much thicker in the 
open and renege conditions than in the exploding offer condition with binding 
acceptances. 
 
Figure 3: Cumulative acceptances within a market: For each treatment, for the last five 
markets, the cumulative proportion of final acceptances up to the end of each period. 
 
III.B. What are the costs of unraveling?  
From this point on, we eliminate from our main analysis one outlier session of the renege 
treatment. In that particular session there was one applicant who never accepted an offer.  
No other applicant in any session of any treatment behaved in this way. Such behavior 
may affect the timing of the market, showing that the results of sections III.A and III.B 
are quite robust. However, such behavior has a very strong impact on the efficiency of a 
market, who matches with whom. Effectively this one session is one in which there were 
only 5 as opposed to 6 applicants. While we could convert efficiency and final matches to 
accommodate this difference, we opt for simplicity (and transparency) to disregard this 
session for the main analysis. In footnotes we will show the analyses that include all 
renege sessions. 
We have seen that the market unravels and lacks thickness when firms can make 
exploding offers and acceptances are binding. Now we investigate the costs of   15
unraveling.
19 We evaluate the different treatments according to the quality of the 
resulting matches. How much use do firms make of the information about applicants that 
becomes available over time? We consider three benchmarks: assortative matching when 
only one signal is available, assortative matching with two signals, and assortative 
matching once all the uncertainty about applicants’ qualities is resolved (the efficient 
outcome).   
We calculate the value of the assortative match after the 1
st signal
 by producing an 
assortative match between firms and applicants according to the applicants’ first signal. 
We use the actual quality of applicants determined during the experiment to compute the 
value of this match.
20 The value of the assortative match with 2 signals is computed 
analogously. Let “1
 Signal” and “2
 Signals” denote the value of the assortative match 
after the first and after the second signal respectively, and “Efficient” the value of the 
unique stable and efficient match once all signals are known. Figure 4 shows the averages 
across sessions and markets of (Actual Profits – 1 Signal)/(Efficient – 1
 Signal), and 
(Actual Profits – 2 Signals)/(Efficient – 2
 Signals). That is it shows the relative gains of 
the outcome of the experimental market towards efficiency compared to assortative 
matching after 1 signal and after 2 signals. 
 
Profits compared to assortative matching after 
 4a:  1  Signal        4b:  2  Signals 
Figure 4a and 4b. 4a shows for each treatment the value of (Actual Profits – 1 
Signal)/(Efficient – 1
 Signal) averaged across sessions. That is it shows the relative gains 
                                                           
19 Of course, these costs would be different in different environments.  One way to interpret the results in 
this section, therefore, is that they demonstrate that unraveling of transactions occurs even when it is quite 
costly in terms of the information lost. 
20 In case of ties in the first signal between two applicants, we take the average of the two possible 
outcomes.   16
of the actual match towards efficiency compared to assortative matching after 1 signal. 
Figure 4b shows the similar results for 2 signals. 
 
Figure 4a shows that all treatments achieve on average a social surplus higher than 
assortative matching with one signal. Efficiency gains are significantly lower in the 
exploding offer treatment than in the open (p = 0.06) and the renege treatment (p = 
0.01).
21 Assortative matching based on 2 signals (the second signal becomes available at 
period 4) would have resulted in a higher efficiency than the exploding offer treatment, 
but both the Open and Renege treatment achieve higher efficiency levels than assortative 
matching after two signals. Furthermore, both the open offer and renege treatment 
achieve significantly higher efficiency gains than the exploding offer treatment (p < 0.01 
and p = 0.06
22 respectively), while they are not significantly different from each other (p 
= 0.47). When we look at final absolute efficiency levels, the efficiency of the exploding 
offer treatment is significantly lower than of the open offer treatment (p = 0.03) and the 
renege treatment (p  = 0.01), while the renege and the open offer treatment are not 




A different way to measure the functioning of a market is to count the number of 
“disruptive” blocking pairs; these are a firm and a worker, at least one of whom is 
matched, who are currently not matched to each other, but would both prefer to be so, 
instead of remaining with their current match (or being unmatched).
25 For the last 5 
markets, the exploding offer treatment has, on average, in each market 3 such (firm, 
                                                           
21 When we include the outlier session in the renege treatment, the value of the proportion of gains from 
assortative matching after one signal towards efficiency is 0.69 (instead of 0.88). The exploding offer 
treatment still achieves significantly lower proportionate gains in efficiency starting from the assortative 
match after 1 signal than all the sessions in the renege treatment: p = 0.03. 
22 When we include all renege sessions, the value of the proportion of gains from assortative matching after 
two signals towards efficiency is 0.14 (as opposed to 0.56). The p-value when we include all renege 
sessions and compare them to the efficiency gains in the exploding offer treatment is p = 0.25. 
23 All treatments achieve high levels of efficiency (compared to the alternative of no firm being matched). 
The efficiency in the exploding offer treatment is 93% compared to 96% in the open offer treatment and 
98% in the renege treatment. However, even a random allocation of the six applicants to the five firms 
achieves an efficiency of 75%. Average efficiency of assortative matching after one signal is 88% and after 
two signals it is 93%.  We’ll see below that even small changes in efficiency can be associated with big 
changes in payoffs to differently ranked participants. 
24 When we include all renege sessions, the comparison with the exploding offer treatment has a p-value of 
0.07, the comparison to the open offer treatment yields p = 0.37. 
25 These are blocking pairs that would disrupt the outcome of the market, had they the chance. (Blocking 
pairs that only involve unmatched participants are much less disruptive, and in naturally occurring markets 
they often have a subsequent opportunity to match to one another.)   17
applicant) pairs, which is significantly higher than the about 1 such pair in the open (p < 




III.C. Individual level consequences of unraveling 
We have seen the loss of social surplus when firms can make exploding offers that are 
binding, compared to when offers have to be open or applicants can renege on their 
acceptance. Now we investigate the value of the match for each applicant and each firm 
separately, for the last five markets of each treatment.  
The Firms 
The following graph shows for each firm the average quality of the applicant they are 
matched to and the average quality of the applicant that remains unmatched.  
  
Figure 5: The average quality of the applicant each firm is matched to in the last five markets of 
each treatment. UM shows the quality of applicants who remain unmatched. Efficient shows for 
each firm the quality of the applicant in the unique stable and socially efficient match.  
 
The exploding offer treatment significantly lowers the payoff of the highest quality firm, 
firm 5, by 16% compared to the open (p < 0.01) and by 15% compared to the renege (p = 
0.05) treatment. But the low quality firms, firm 2 and firm 1, achieve a significantly 
higher payoff in the exploding offer treatment, compared to the open offer treatment (p = 
                                                           
26 The open offer and renege treatment, do not differ significantly in the number of blocking pairs (p = 
0.22). When we use all the renege sessions, the p-values are < 0.01 and 0.46, when comparing it to the 
exploding and open treatment respectively. 
27 The maximum feasible number of disruptive blocking pairs is 15 and achieved by anti-assortative 
matching. Then the matched firm 5 generates 5 blocking pairs (4 of which use matched applicants), firm 4 
generates 4, firm 3 generates 3, firm 2 generates 2 and firm 1 generates only 1.)   18
0.06 and p = 0.07 for firm 2 and firm 1 respectively) and the renege treatment (p < 0.01 
and p = 0.099).
28 In the exploding offer treatment, firm 2 gains 45% compared to the 
open offer and 34% compared to the renege treatment. The difference in the quality of 
applicants between firm 2 and firm 5 is 0.92 in the exploding offer treatment, which is 
significantly lower than in the open offer treatment, 3.07 (p < 0.01) and the renege 





The following figure shows for each applicant the average quality of the firm they are 
matched to in the last five markets for each treatment.  
 
Figure 6: The average quality of the firm the applicant is matched to in the last five markets of 
each treatment, where UM is unmatched. “Efficient” shows for each applicant the quality of the 
firm in the unique stable and socially efficient match.  
 
As for the firms, it is the high quality applicants, applicant A6 and A5 that receive a 
significantly lower match in the exploding offer treatment than in the open offer 
treatment (by 10% and 11% with p = 0.05 and p = 0.05 for applicant 6 and 5 
respectively) and the renege treatment (by 17% and 13% with p = 0.02 in both cases). 
And it is a medium quality applicant, applicant 3, who significantly gains from 
unraveling (by 49% and 57% with p = 0.03 and 0.04 compared to the open and renege 
                                                           
28 When we include all renege sessions, the p-values for firm 5, when comparing the exploding offer to the 
renege treatment is p = 0.02, while it is p = 0.03 for firm 2 and p = 0.05 for firm 1. 
29 When we include all renege sessions the p-value is 0.01. 
30 In all treatments higher quality firms hire higher quality applicants, on average, but not in each session.   19
treatment respectively).
31 In all treatments higher quality applicants are hired by higher 
quality firms, on average. The difference in the quality of firms between applicant 3 and 
applicant 6 is 1.2 in the exploding offer treatment, which is significantly lower than in the 
open offer treatment, 2.9 (p < 0.01) and the renege treatment, 3.04 (p < 0.01).
32 
 
The inefficient matchings in these markets are costly for the highest quality firms 




IV. Implications for market design  
 
  Gastroenterology Fellows 
From 1986 to the mid 1990’s, the labor market for gastroenterology fellows (entry level 
gastroenterologists) was organized through a centralized match that operated one year 
before employment would begin.  The match collapsed following a shock to the market 
that caused fellowship programs and applicants to make early contracts before the match 
(C. Nicholas McKinney, Niederle, and Roth, 2005). Following the collapse of the match, 
the market unraveled, and the hiring of fellows became increasingly early and dispersed, 
with exploding offers, eventually moving almost two years before employment would 
begin.
34 One consequence was that what had been a national market was replaced by 
more local markets, in which gastroenterologists were more likely to be recruited from 
the local pool of applicants (Niederle and Roth 2003a). 
  As these facts became increasingly well known to gastroenterologists, there was a 
growing interest in reestablishing a match, to move the date of hiring nearer the date of 
employment, and to make the market thicker.  However, doing so would require 
fellowship directors to refrain from early hiring prior to the first use of the match (as well 
                                                           
31 When we include all renege sessions, the p-values are for applicants 6, 5 and 3: p = 0.01, p = 0.11 and p 
= 0.04 respectively. 
32 When we include all renege sessions, the p-value is less than 0.01. 
33 For this reason, it is sometimes difficult to achieve consensus in markets that suffer from unraveling 
about what steps, if any, to take to address the problem. See Niederle and Roth (2005) for discussion of the 
situation facing gastroenterologists as they started to consider whether to organize a centralized 
clearinghouse. 
34 For the effects of the loss of the match see Niederle and Roth 2004, 2005, Niederle, Proctor and Roth 
2006. Niederle and Roth 2003b show that other parts of the contract (apart from who matches to whom), 
such as wages, seem not to have been affected by the loss of the match.   20
as in subsequent years).  With the memory of the collapse of the match clearly in mind, 
many program directors who were themselves interested in participating in a well 
organized market at a later date were concerned that their competitors would gain an 
advantage over them by making early exploding offers in an effort to “capture” 
promising candidates before the match.
35 
In reply to this concern, we related the experience of the market for new Ph.D.’s,   
and shared the result of the experiment reported above.  The American Gastroenterology 
Association subsequently published a policy statement containing a resolution modeled 
after that of the Council of Graduate Schools (Niederle, Proctor, and Roth, 2006). A 
modified version of this was adopted by all four major Gastroenterology professional 
organizations, regarding offers made before the (new) match.  It states, in part 
 
The general spirit of this resolution is that each applicant should have an 
opportunity to consider all programs before making a decision and be able to 
participate in the Match. … It therefore seeks to create rules that give both 
programs and applicants the confidence that applicants and positions will remain 
available to be filled through the Match and not withdrawn in advance of it. 
 
This resolution addresses the issue that some applicants may be persuaded or 
coerced to make commitments prior to, or outside of, the Match. ... Any applicant 
may participate in the matching process … by … resigning the accepted position 
if he/she wishes to submit a rank order list of programs … The spirit of this 
resolution is to make it unprofitable for program directors to press applicants to 
accept early offers, and to give applicants an opportunity to consider all offers … 
 
The gastroenterology match for 2007 fellows was held June 21, 2006, and succeeded in 
attracting 121 of the 154 eligible fellowship programs (79%).  98% of the positions 
offered in the match were filled through the match, and so it appears that the 
gastroenterology community succeeded in changing the timing and thickness of the 
market.
36 
Part of the success of the gastroenterology match was due to the fact that early 
movers couldn’t impose a big negative externality on those who waited for the match, 
                                                           
35 In June 2005, our colleague Debbie Proctor, the gastroenterologist who took the lead in reorganizing the 
match, sent us an email saying, in part “I’m answering 3-4 emails per day especially on this issue. ‘I want 
to make sure MY competition is in the match and that they don’t cheat.’ Well, this is another way of saying 
that if they cheat, then I will too!...Have you ever seen this before? The distrust amongst program directors? 
I find it hard to believe that we are unique. Maybe this is [a] social science phenomenon?” 
36 The second match, in June 2007, attracted even greater participation (Niederle, Proctor, and Roth 2008).   21
since pre-match exploding offers would not necessarily remove candidates from the 
market.  This made it easier for everyone to wait for the match.   
Not every attempt to facilitate a thick market by constructing an orderly 
marketplace takes this approach, and the markets for new orthopaedic surgeons and law 
clerks are instructive in their similarities and differences from the market for 
gastroenterologists. 
 
  Orthopaedic Surgeons and Law Clerks 
The Gastroenterology professional organizations turned out not to be able to 
prevent fellowship directors from making exploding offers, but they were able to 
empower applicants to decline pre-match offers that they had previously accepted.  In 
contrast, Orthopedic Surgery has an unraveled market and is considering a match, and it 
is not clear whether young surgeons can effectively be empowered in this way. That is, it 
may be that young orthopaedic surgeons are launching their careers in a sufficiently small 
market with repeated interactions that there is nothing the professional organizations can 
do that will effectively allow young surgeons to renege on promises extracted from them 
by senior surgeons. However, at least some of the orthopaedic surgery professional 
organizations feel that (unlike the gastroenterology organizations) they may be able to 
effectively require fellowship directors to desist from making exploding offers 
(Christopher Harner et al. 2008). So it may be that in orthopaedic surgery, the option of 
requiring open offers will be effective, even if no policy allowing students to renege on 
offers would be.
37  
The market for federal court clerks suffers the worst of both worlds, since the 
judicial organizations can neither restrain judges from making exploding offers, nor 
effectively empower law students to renege on even a verbal contract with a judge.  This 
market has periodically suffered serious market failures in which clerks are sometimes 
hired two years in advance, i.e. at the beginning of the second year of law school (Roth 
and Xing 1994; Avery et al. 2001). In the most recent  effort to repair the market, 
beginning in March of 2002, a large majority of Federal appellate judges voted to hire 
only after Labor Day 2003, and to hire third year (and not second year) law students.  
That is, like the gastroenterology fellows market, the law clerk market sought to replace 
                                                           
37 We know of another market (for clinical neuropsychologists) in which a policy of allowing applicants to 
renege on early exploding offers was rejected as being simply repugnant (cf. Roth 2007).   22
early and diffuse hiring with hiring at a specified time a year later than had become 
customary.   
While the first four years following the new proposal succeeded in moving the 
hiring date, it appears that there has been substantial cheating on the precise opening time 
of the market, and an increase in offers that explode immediately (Avery et al. 2007).  
The modal respondent to the student survey reported in Avery et al. (2007) accepted an 
offer on the first day that offers were allowed. So, although the market has so far largely 
succeeded in controlling the dates of appointment, for many participants the market 
remains very thin: applicants can often consider no more than a single offer. 
  Given that law students are almost never reported to renege on promises made to 
senior Federal judges (Avery et al 2001), the results of the present experiment give us a 
clear prediction: the problem of early contracting will not be solved by the current 
attempt to change the date of the market while leaving the market rules and customs 
intact.  Rather, more fundamental changes in the market culture of judges and law clerks 
will be needed.
38   
 
  Exploding offers and congestion  
The main result of our experiment is that late, efficient hiring is fostered by  open 
offers by firms, or the flexibility for applicants to change their minds about early 
acceptances, either of which prevents firms from permanently “capturing” applicants 
early through exploding offers. Note that this works  because our market is uncongested. 
Firms that wait until the efficient time to make offers can make as many offers as they 
might need, so they don't run an unacceptable risk of remaining unmatched.  
  In an environment in which congestion is a large problem (i.e. an environment in 
which many offers would have to be made to clear the market, relative to the time 
available) exploding offers have the potentially positive effect of combating congestion 
by increasing the number of offers a firm can make, and some early matching may be 
important to allow the market to clear.
39 However, exploding offers are also often used 
strategically to make the market thin for applicants, and in many cases this leads to 
                                                           
38 On this point, see also the discussion in Haruvy, Roth, and Unver (2006), concerning other aspects of the 
market culture in the law clerk market. That experiment focuses on a different aspect of offers in the law 
clerk market, namely that applicants may not feel able to refuse the first offer they receive.   
39 Previous experiments have looked at matching in congested decentralized markets in which early, 
exploding offers arise in part as firms seek to avoid being unmatched (see Kagel and Roth, 2002).   23
markets that operate well before employment begins. That is, while exploding offers can 
sometimes be an efficiency-enhancing response to congestion, they lead to the problems 
discussed in this paper, which often leads to unraveling beyond what seems warranted by 
congestion problems.
40  
This helps explain why the rules for offers and acceptances in the market for 
graduate students works well for that market. Graduate programs admit relatively large 
numbers of students, and are not too sensitive to the precise numbers in the entering 
class.  So graduate programs can make many offers at once, and the successful control of 
the dates of appointment via policies that effectively prevent exploding offers goes a long 
way towards establishing the orderly and stable decentralized market that has persisted 
for many years.
41  
  This is also why such a policy for discouraging early offers worked well in the 
market for gastroenterology fellows. By using a match, they solved the congestion 
problem. The remaining problem was whether gastroenterology programs and fellows 
could safely wait for the match. This is exactly the problem that our experimental results 
indicate can be solved with appropriate policies about offers and acceptances.    
This also helps explain why, before the adoption of a match, policies encouraging 
open offers at a fixed time worked less well for medical residencies and fellowships. 
Those are markets in which it is hard to tolerate uncertainty about the number of residents 
and fellows. Accreditation requirements generally prevent fellowship and residency 
programs from offering even one more than their target number of positions.  So 
residency programs had to make sequential offers. In the 1940's (for residency programs, 
and in the 1980's for fellowship programs) policies were tried that attempted to encourage 
program directors to make offers that would remain open for a longer period of time. 
However, these markets experienced large congestion problems, and were eventually 
replaced by a centralized match (Roth, 1984, 2003). The policies that worked well in our 
experiments did not succeed in the absence of a solution to the congestion problem. 
 
                                                           
40 Note that in our experiment too, in the treatment with exploding offers and binding agreements, many 
markets lasted for more than 5 periods (the number of firms to be matched) and the first match often 
occurred before period 4, that is, with more than 6 periods left in the market. Our experiment is designed to 
show that exploding offers with binding agreements can lead to unraveling even in the absence of 
congestion.  
41 Despite the congestion around April 15 which may make the size of entering classes uncertain.   24
V. Discussion 
Market design has often been concerned with centralized marketplaces such as auctions 
or clearinghouses (cf. Milgrom 2004 and Roth, 2002). But even centralized marketplaces 
need to make it safe for agents to participate, rather than transacting in a decentralized 
way outside of the marketplace.  For the gastroenterology labor market, this involved 
adjusting the rules of the decentralized market. 
  A striking feature of many markets is that market participants spend a good deal 
of effort addressing how and when offers are made, accepted, and rejected.  The formal 
and informal rules, customs, and norms that result are a critical element of the widely 
different ways that the matching processes in these markets are organized. In some 
markets, exploding offers are the norm, and applicants for positions find themselves 
faced with offers that must be accepted or rejected before other offers may be considered 
or even received.  In others, exploding offers are discouraged, or made more difficult to 
use to advantage.   
Observation of these markets suggests the hypothesis that exploding offers with 
binding acceptances are potent facilitators of inefficiently early matching. But because 
these many markets are also quite different from one another in other respects than their 
norms concerning offers and acceptances, it is natural to look to the laboratory to isolate 
the effects of different rules and customs concerning exploding offers. 
  The results of our experiment confirm the hypothesis motivated by the natural 
markets, that exploding offers together with binding acceptances make it difficult to 
avoid early and dispersed transactions. In the same environment, late and thick markets 
are achieved by either allowing only open offers, or allowing applicants to renege on 
early acceptances.  
    The  problem  facing  applicants  who receive early exploding offers when 
acceptances are binding is that, to reject such an offer, an applicant must hope for a better 
offer later in the market, hence hope not only that he will be highly ranked in the later 
market, but also that high quality firms will not fill their positions early. Once some 
applicants are ready to accept early offers, they impose a negative externality on high 
quality firms, making the whole market move early. We have seen in other environments 
that to successfully halt unraveling, a major factor is that applicants must be willing to 
reject early offers (Kagel and Roth 2000, McKinney, Niederle and Roth 2005, Unver   25
2001, Haruvy et al. 2006). When offers are open, or when applicants can renege on their 
acceptances, then the market does not have to depend on applicants’ willingness to reject 
early offers to have most of its transactions happen efficiently late.  
 
More generally, market design is about the details of how markets work, and so designs 
for different markets may sometimes be quite different.  But it appears that there may be 
quite a bit of generality across markets about some kinds of details that are important.  In 
particular, the details of the sometimes informal rules and practices governing how offers 
are made, compared, and accepted or rejected are can be critical elements of a market’s 
design.   
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Online Appendix: Instructions for the exploding offer treatment, the other 
instructions are adapted accordingly.  
 
WELCOME 
  Thank you for participating in this experiment about economic decision making. 
It is important that during the experiment you remain silent.  If you have any questions, 
or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand, and I will come to assist you. 
Thank you for your cooperation. 
 
The decisions made in this experiment are hiring decisions. Accordingly, your role will 
be either “firm” or “applicant.” Your role, firm or applicant, will stay the same 
throughout the experiment. In other words, if you begin as a FIRM, you will remain a 
FIRM until the end of the experiment. Similarly, if you begin as an APPLICANT, you 
will remain an APPLICANT until the end of the experiment.  
 
The experiment will have many “markets,” which will last nine “periods” each.  
 
 If you are a “firm,” to get a positive payoff in a given market of the experiment you will 
need to hire one, and only one, applicant in that market. 
 
If you are an “applicant” you will need to accept one, and only one, job offer in each 
market of the experiment. 
 
In each group, there are five firms and six applicants. The firms are numbered 1 through 
5, and the applicants are numbered 1-6. 
 
The firms and applicants are assigned “qualities.” Your payoff as a firm is your quality 
multiplied by the quality of the applicant you have hired. Similarly, your payoff as an 
applicant is the product of your quality and your employing firm’s quality. For example, 
if a firm of quality 3 hires an applicant of quality 4, both firm and applicant will receive a 
payoff of  3x4 =  12 points each. 
 
Firms’ qualities are simply their assigned participant number. In other words, if you are 
firm 3, your quality is 3. If you are firm 4, your quality is 4. 
 
Applicants’ “qualities,” in contrast, have nothing to do with their assigned ID number and 
depend solely on the applicant’s “grades” and “scores.” 
 
Exactly how are applicants’ qualities determined? 
 
In period 1, 4 and 7, each applicant receives a “grade,” which is a number between 1 and  
10, with 10 being the best possible grade and 1 being the worst possible grade. The 
computer generates these grades randomly, with each of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 
having an equal chance of occurrence.  
 
So, in period 1, each applicant has a grade between 1 and 10, which is the applicant’s “1. 
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first grade (from period 1) and the second grade (from period 4) is the applicant’s 
“2.score.” In period 7 each applicant receives a third grade between 1 and 10. The sum of 
the first, second and third grade is the applicant’s “3. score.”  
 
The “3. score” determines the applicant’s final quality, through its ranking relative to the 
other applicants’ “3. scores”. The applicant with the highest “3. score” has a quality of 6. 
The applicant with the second highest “3. score” has a quality of 5, and so on. The 
applicant with the lowest “3. score”, has a quality of 1. In case of ties, that is, when two 
applicants have the same “3. score,” the computer will break ties and randomly give one 
a higher quality than the other.  
 
For example, let’s say that applicant 5 receives in period 1 a grade of 2, so the “1. score” 
is 2. In period 4 applicant 5 receives 6, so the “2. score” is 2+6=8. In period 7 the 
applicant receives a grade of 9 which means the “3. score” is 2+6+9=17. Let’s say that 
the other 5 applicants have “3. scores” of 22, 15, 15, 12 and 7. Then, our applicant 5 has 
the second highest ”3. score” and is assigned quality 5. The two applicants with “3. 
score” 15 get qualities 4 and 3 (they are the third and fourth highest). The computer will 
randomly determine which of the two receives quality 4 and which quality 3.  
 
In the experiment you will see only the scores (not the grades from which they are 
composed), but now you know how they are determined. The “1. score” will be available 
at the beginning of period 1, the “2. score” will become known in period 4, and the final 
“quality” of each applicant will be known starting in period 7. 
 
Making and accepting offers 
 
Firms can make two types of offers: 
An exploding offer is an offer that the applicant can only accept or reject right away, in 
the same period as the offer was made.  
An open offer is an offer that the applicant can accept, reject or “hold”. An open offer can 
be held by the applicant until the last period, when he has to decide whether to accept or 
reject the offer. An open offer will remain open as long as the applicant holds it. (Each 
applicant who hasn’t already accepted an offer can hold no more than one offer at a 
time.) A firm with an open offer that is being held cannot make another offer: a firm can 
only have one offer outstanding at any time. 
 
Firm’s decisions in each period 
A firm that has not yet hired an applicant, and has no open offer being held by an 
applicant, has to decide whether to make an offer, and, if so, to which applicant. A firm 
may make at most one offer in a period. Once the firm types in the ID number of the 
applicant to whom the offer is made, the firm has to decide whether to make an open or 
exploding offer. An exploding offer is one the applicant has to accept or reject in this 
period. If the offer is open, the applicant can also choose to hold the offer, and postpone 
the decision whether to accept or reject it. A firm can only have one offer outstanding in 
each period, so a firm with an open offer that is held by an applicant cannot make another 
offer.  
 
Applicants’ decisions in each period.   31
In each period the applicant sees all the offers she has received that period, including 
possibly an open offer she decided to hold from the previous period. The applicant has to 
decide whether to accept or reject her offers. If the offer is an open offer, the applicant 
can decide to hold this offer, which means this offer will be available for her also next 
period.  (An open offer that was held from the previous period must be held again at this 
period if the applicant wants to continue to hold it.) In any period the applicant can only 
hold one offer. All the offers that are not accepted or held are automatically rejected. (In 
the last period, period 9, the applicant can only accept or reject offers). When an 
applicant accepts an offer from a firm, we say the applicant and the firm are matched to 
each other. 
 
Once a firm and an applicant are matched, the firm cannot make any further offers, and 
the applicant cannot accept any further offers. The firms cannot make offers to applicants 
who are matched, so a matched applicant will not receive any further offers. 
 
The information on the Screen of Applicants and Firms: 
In the top left box you can see whether you are a firm or an applicant. Let’s start by 
looking at a sample screen for one of the firms: we are looking at a screen of Firm 2. 
 
The screen shot is from period 7, at which point all the information about applicants, their 
“1. score”, their “2. score” and their final “quality” is available. (In periods 1-3 only the 
“1. score” is available, in periods 4-6 the “1. score” and the “2. score” are available, and 
the final quality is only available starting at period 7.)  
 
If you are a firm, your ID number (and hence your quality) will remain fixed across 
markets.  
 
In the top right you can see the current period in the market. Each market has 9 periods, 
and new information about the applicants becomes available in periods 1, 4 and 7. Any 
firm (and applicant) who is not matched by the end of period 9, remains unmatched in 
this market, and earns zero points. 
 
On the bottom right there is a box called “Applicant’s Scores”. In this box is a list of 
applicants’ scores and qualities as they become available over time. The ordering is 
according to the applicants’ ID numbers (which are randomly assigned in every market). 
In the sample screen you can see that Applicant 1 has quality 5, while applicant 3 has 
quality 2. 
 
On the top left the firm has a box called “Matchings” which shows which of the firms 
have already hired which applicant, at what period and with what score or quality. The 
entries are ordered by year of acceptance of the offer by the applicant. For firm 2, the 
entry that corresponds to firm 2, is marked by ** 2 ** instead of just 2 in the column 
labeled “hired by firm”.  
 
On the bottom right the firm has a box that reminds them of the points they receive for a 
match.  
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All the boxes we discussed so far, are also available on the screen of the applicants. Now 
we discuss the part that is specific to firms.  
 
The box headed “List of Applicants” shows for each applicant the relevant score or 
quality, and by which firm they are hired (where 0 means they are not hired by any firm 
yet). Note that on this list, applicants are listed in order of quality (or, before period 7, in 
order of their most recent score, with the highest scoring applicant listed at the top of the 
list, etc.). Thus on this screen, applicant 4 is listed first, with a quality of 6, applicant 1 is 
next, and so forth. 
 
 
In the box below, the firm can choose to make an offer.  To make an offer, the firm types 
in the ID of the applicant to whom the offer is directed, and then clicks on the choice of 
an “exploding” or “open” offer. To make the offer the firm has to click the “make offer” 
button. The firm cannot make an offer to an applicant who is already matched to another 
firm. 
 
If the firm does not want to make an offer, or is already matched or has an open offer 
held by an applicant, the firm has to click the “No Offer” button.  
 
On the left, in the middle, the firm can see if she is already matched (has already hired an 
applicant) and which one. The second line shows if the firm has an open offer and to 
which applicant. In period 7 the last line appears that shows the points the firm receives 
in this market, if she is already matched (it shows 0 points if she is unmatched). In our 
example, firm 2 and applicant 1 (of quality 5) are matched to each other, and hence firm 
2 (and applicant 1) earn each 2x5 =10 points in Market 1. 
 
Below, on the bottom left, is a table that shows each firm all her offers that were rejected 
in this market. For example, Firm 2 made an exploding offer in period 1 to applicant 1 
that was rejected in period 1. 
 
The Applicant: 
The screen shot is from applicant 2 in period 7 (as can be seen in the top 2 boxes). Each 
applicant will receive a new ID number in every market, which has nothing to do with the 
final quality that is determined throughout the market.  
 
The table headed “The scores” lists your scores and qualities as they become available 
over time.  Applicant 2 turns out to have quality 4 in this example; this means he has the 
third highest quality (the highest is 6, the lowest is 1). 
 
The applicant has a box called “Matchings,” showing which of the firms have already 
hired which applicant, at what period. The entries are ordered by year of acceptance of 
the offer by the applicant.  
 
Now we discuss boxes and choices that are only available to applicants. 
 
On the right side the applicant has a table called “Your offers” that shows all the offers 
available (for this applicant) this period and whether the offer is exploding or open. (By   33
the time you see this screen, firms have finished making their offers for this period, so 
this screen shows all the offers you will receive in this period.) In the example, applicant 
2 has one exploding offer, from firm 1. (Applicant 2 has to decide what to do with this 
offer, but he has no need to wait for further offers in this period, as all the firms have 
already finished making offers.) To accept an offer, the applicant has to first click on the 
offer and then the “Accept offer” button. Once an applicant accepted an offer, he is 
matched to that firm (i.e. hired by that firm) for this market, and will not receive any 
subsequent offers. The applicant can also decide to hold at most one open offer, by typing 
in the firm’s ID number (and hence the firms’ quality) that made him such an offer, and 
click the “Hold Offer” button. In that case the applicant will have this offer available in 
the next period. If an applicant holds an offer, all the other offers are automatically 
rejected. The applicant can also decide to reject all offers by clicking the Reject / 
Continue button. If the applicant received no offers, he nevertheless has to click the 
“Reject / Continue” button so the experiment can proceed. Once you have made your 
decision, click the necessary button promptly, in order that the experiment will not take 
an excessively long time.  
 
The table in the middle left shows whether and to whom the applicant is matched, 
whether the applicant decided to hold an offer and from which firm. In period 7 the last 
line appears that shows the points the applicant receives in this market, if he is already 
matched (otherwise it shows 0 points). 
 
The box in the bottom left shows the offers the applicant rejected in this market, ordered 
by the year in which they were rejected. 
 
PAYMENT: 
The payment you receive in this experiment has two components.  
The first is based on your performance in the experiment: For each point you accumulate 
in the experiment, you receive $ 0.10.  The second component is independent of your 
performance in the experiment, and already determined in advance. It consist of the $10 
show up fee, and for some types of players (already determined) another fixed payment 
that is already determined now.  That is, your behavior in the experiment influences your 
payoff only through the points you accumulate in the markets. 
 
SUMMARY: 
At the beginning of the experiment you learn whether you are a firm or an applicant. If 
you are a firm, you also learn your quality, which is your ID number that you will have 
throughout the whole experiment. If you are an applicant, you receive a new ID number 
in every market, and your ID number has nothing to do with your quality. In each Market 
there are 5 firms and 6 applicants.  
 
Information about Applicants’ qualities is revealed over several periods: 
•  Period 1: Each Applicant receives a grade between 1 and 10 (with each of 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 having an equal chance to occur) that is his “1. score”.  
•  Period 4: each applicant receives another grade of 1,..,10, (each having the same 
chance of occurring) and the sum of the two grades constitute the “2. score”. 
•  Period 7: Each applicant receives a third grade between 1,..,10 (each having the 
same chance of occurring), and the sum of all three grades constitute the “3.   34
score”. The applicant with the highest 3.score receives the highest quality of 6, the 
applicant with the second highest receives quality 5, and so on, until the applicant 
with the lowest score who receives quality 1. 
To earn points in a market, a firm will need to hire one, and only one, applicant in that 
market, and an “applicant” will need to accept one, and only one, job offer. How is this 
done? 
•  In each period, each firm that has not yet hired an applicant, and has no open offer 
being held by an applicant, has to decide whether to make an offer, and, if so, to 
which applicant, and whether the offer should be exploding or open. Each firm 
can only have one outstanding offer in each period.  
•  An exploding offer is an offer to which the applicant must respond immediately. 
If he does not accept it right away (i.e. in the same period that it was made), the 
offer expires, and it is as if he had rejected it. 
•  An open offer is an offer the applicant can accept, reject, or hold. At most one 
offer can be held, in which case it will remain available in the next period. 
•  Once all the firms have made their offers, the applicants see the screen showing 
all the offers they received this period.  (Once an applicant sees his offer screen, 
there will not be any further offers arriving in that period.) 
•  In each period, applicants who receive offers have to decide whether to accept the 
offer, reject the offer, or, if the offer is an open offer, the applicant can decide to 
hold (no more than one) offer. 
•  Once an applicant accepted an offer, he cannot accept another offer in the same 
market, and will no longer receive offers.  
•  Firms and Applicants that are not matched by the end of period 9 in a market 
remain unmatched and earn zero points. 
•  Firms and applicants that are matched to each other each earn points equal to the 
product of the applicant’s quality  and the firm’s quality.  
•  After period 9, a completely new market begins, and everyone is free to try to 
match once again. 
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Screen of Firm 2 
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Screen of Applicant 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 